Proposition 26 and California Utilities

Executive Summary

California Proposition 26, approved by 52.5% of voters on November 2, 2010, fundamentally reshaped the legal framework governing how local governments impose fees and charges on utility end-use customers. Formally titled the "Supermajority Vote to Pass New Taxes and Fees" initiative, Proposition 26 amended Articles XIII A and XIII C of the California Constitution. The measure broadened the definition of "tax" to encompass virtually any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a local government — except for seven specifically enumerated categories of fees that qualify as exempt. Any charge that falls outside these exceptions is reclassified as a tax, triggering supermajority voter-approval requirements.

Proposition 26 is the third major initiative in a four-decade arc of California fiscal reform. Proposition 13 (1978) capped property tax rates and required a two-thirds legislative supermajority for state tax increases. Proposition 218 (1996) extended voter-approval requirements to local taxes and imposed cost-of-service constraints on property-related fees, including water and sewer rates. Proposition 26 completed the triptych by targeting the so-called "regulatory fee" loophole identified in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1997), which had permitted governments to fund broad societal programs through fees imposed on specific industries without voter approval.

For California utilities, Proposition 26 creates distinct compliance obligations depending on the utility's organizational structure and the nature of its charges. Municipal electric utilities face scrutiny over general fund transfers and payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs), a question substantially clarified by the California Supreme Court in Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding (2018). Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs) operate in a regulatory environment shaped by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) rather than by direct local government rate-setting, which insulates them from certain Proposition 26 challenges while exposing them to others — particularly those arising from the franchise fee structure. Water utilities, already subject to Proposition 218's property-related fee provisions, face an overlapping framework in which Proposition 26 applies to charges that do not qualify as property-related fees, such as wholesale water rates and certain groundwater management fees.

The legal landscape continues to evolve. The California Supreme Court's 2022 decision in Zolly v. City of Oakland destabilized assumptions about franchise fee exemptions, creating risk across all utility types that rely on franchise arrangements. The failed Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act, which the Supreme Court removed from the 2024 ballot as an unconstitutional revision, signals continuing political pressure to further tighten restrictions on government-imposed fees. Utility decision-makers must understand this framework not as a settled question, but as an active, contested area of constitutional law with direct implications for rate design, revenue sufficiency, and general fund contributions.

Constitutional Framework: From Proposition 13 to Proposition 26

California's constitutional restrictions on local government revenues represent a layered system built over three decades of voter-initiated reform. Understanding how Proposition 26 operates requires tracing the full arc from Proposition 13 through Proposition 218 to the current framework. Each initiative responded to perceived abuses in local government finance, and each created new constraints that local governments subsequently worked to navigate — prompting further reform.

Proposition 13 (1978): The Foundation

Proposition 13 capped property tax rates at 1% of assessed value, limited assessment increases to 2% annually, and required a two-thirds vote of the Legislature for state tax increases and a two-thirds voter approval for local special taxes. The immediate effect was a 60% reduction in statewide property tax revenues. Over subsequent decades, local governments increasingly turned to fees, assessments, and user charges as alternative revenue sources — tools that were not subject to Proposition 13's supermajority requirements.

Proposition 218 (1996): Closing the Assessment Loophole

Proposition 218 added Articles XIII C and XIII D to the California Constitution, imposing voter-approval requirements for all local government taxes and cost-of-service constraints on property-related fees. Article XIII C required voter approval before any local government could impose, extend, or increase any tax — general taxes by majority vote, special taxes by two-thirds vote. Article XIII D imposed substantive requirements on property-related fees, including water, sewer, and refuse rates: fees could not exceed the proportional cost of service to the parcel, revenues could not be used for purposes other than the stated service, and agencies bore the burden of demonstrating compliance.

Critically, Proposition 218 exempted fees for electrical and gas service from Article XIII D's property-related fee requirements. This exemption meant that municipal electric utilities were not subject to the same cost-of-service and protest-hearing procedures required of water and sewer utilities. However, this exemption applied only to Article XIII D — electric utility fees remained potentially subject to Article XIII C's tax provisions.

Sinclair Paint and the Regulatory Fee Doctrine

The California Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization created the doctrinal opening that Proposition 26 was designed to close. In Sinclair Paint, the Court upheld a fee imposed on lead paint manufacturers to fund childhood lead poisoning prevention programs. The Court distinguished between taxes (imposed for revenue purposes) and regulatory fees (imposed to mitigate adverse effects of the fee-payer's activities), holding that the latter did not require voter approval. This ruling established a broad category of "mitigating-effects regulatory fees" that governments could impose with a simple majority vote.

In the years following Sinclair Paint, state and local governments used the regulatory fee doctrine to fund a wide range of programs — environmental remediation, public health initiatives, recycling programs — through fees that critics argued were functionally indistinguishable from taxes. Proposition 26's drafters explicitly identified these "mitigating-effects regulatory fees" as the primary target of the initiative.

Proposition 26 (2010): Redefining "Tax"

Proposition 26 amended Article XIII A (state taxes) and Article XIII C (local taxes) to adopt a new, expansive definition of "tax" as any levy, charge, or exaction of any kind imposed by a government entity. The measure then carved out seven specific exceptions for local governments. Any charge that does not fit within one of these exceptions is a tax subject to voter-approval requirements.

Proposition 26 also shifted the burden of proof. The local government bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a levy is not a tax, that the amount does not exceed the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that cost allocations bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor's burdens on, or benefits received from, the activity. This burden-shifting provision has been particularly significant in litigation, as it requires governments to affirmatively justify their fee structures rather than simply defending them.

Key Court Decisions

Proposition 26's practical meaning for utilities has been defined largely through litigation, not through the text of the initiative alone. Five decisions — three from the California Supreme Court and two from appellate courts — form the core of the current legal framework.

Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles (2013)

Schmeer established that a charge must involve revenue flowing to the government to constitute a "tax" under Proposition 26. The case concerned a 10-cent fee that Los Angeles County required retailers to charge for paper bags under a plastic-bag-ban ordinance. The Court of Appeal held that because the fee revenue remained with the retailers (to offset their costs of providing bags) and did not flow to the government, the charge was not a levy "imposed by a local government" within the meaning of Article XIII C. This decision narrowed Proposition 26's reach to charges that actually generate government revenue — a critical distinction for pass-through charges and surcharges in the utility context.

Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding (2015, 2018)

The City of Redding litigation, which reached the California Supreme Court in 2018, is the foundational case for municipal electric utility transfers under Proposition 26. The City of Redding operated a municipal electric utility and made an annual budgetary transfer — a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) — from its electric utility fund to its general fund. The PILOT was calculated at a rate approximating the ad valorem property taxes a private utility would pay. After Proposition 26's passage in 2010, the City approved a rate increase for electric service. Citizens challenged the PILOT as an unauthorized tax.

The Court of Appeal (2015) reversed the trial court's ruling for the City, holding that the PILOT itself had to be justified as a reasonable cost of service — that it was not enough to simply show low overall rates. The appellate court rejected the argument that the existence of other non-rate revenues to cover the PILOT insulated the rates from Proposition 26 scrutiny. However, the Court of Appeal left open the possibility that a PILOT could be justified if tied to actual costs the city incurs in providing services to the utility.

The California Supreme Court (2018) drew a critical distinction between costs of providing service and rates charged to customers. The Court held that the PILOT is a cost to the electric utility — not an exaction imposed on ratepayers — and is therefore not itself subject to Proposition 26. The rates charged to customers are the charges subject to Proposition 26's requirements. Because the Redding electric utility had sufficient non-rate revenue (primarily from wholesale power sales) to cover the PILOT entirely, the Court did not need to determine whether the PILOT was a "reasonable cost of service." The ruling left unresolved the question of whether a PILOT funded entirely or primarily from retail rates would survive Proposition 26 scrutiny.

Webb v. City of Riverside (2018) and Humphreville v. City of Los Angeles (2020)

Webb and Humphreville extended the City of Redding framework to other municipal electric utility transfers. In Webb, the Court of Appeal upheld the City of Riverside's change in the formula used to calculate its general fund transfer from the electric utility, finding that the transfer was not an exaction subject to Proposition 26. In Humphreville, the Court of Appeal applied similar reasoning to the City of Los Angeles's annual surplus transfer from the Department of Water and Power (DWP) to the City's general fund, concluding that the interfund transfer was a cost of the utility rather than a tax on ratepayers. The Humphreville court explicitly held that the relevant question under Proposition 26 is whether the rates charged to customers exceed the reasonable costs of providing the service — including the transfer — not whether the transfer itself is independently justified.

Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017)

Jacks addressed franchise fees — specifically, a surcharge that Southern California Edison (SCE) passed through to Santa Barbara ratepayers to recover a franchise fee paid to the City. The Supreme Court held that a franchise fee is not a tax so long as the fee bears a "reasonable relationship to the value of the franchise." However, any portion of the fee that exceeds the franchise's reasonable value is a tax subject to voter approval. The Court did not establish a methodology for determining the "reasonable value" of a franchise, leaving that determination to case-by-case analysis.

Zolly v. City of Oakland (2022)

Zolly is the most consequential recent Proposition 26 decision, and its implications extend across all utility types. The City of Oakland awarded exclusive solid-waste franchise contracts to two private haulers, who agreed to pay negotiated franchise fees to the City. Property owners challenged the fees as taxes, arguing they were passed through to customers and bore no reasonable relationship to the franchise's value.

The Supreme Court held: (1) franchise fees are "imposed by local government" within the meaning of Proposition 26, even when negotiated through contract; (2) Oakland had not demonstrated as a matter of law that its franchise fees fit within any of Proposition 26's exceptions; and (3) the case was remanded for further factual proceedings. The Court left open the question of how "reasonable costs" apply to franchise fees and whether the analysis should extend beyond purely administrative costs.

Impacts on Municipal Electric Utilities

Municipal electric utilities occupy a unique position within the Proposition 26 framework because electric and gas service fees are exempt from Proposition 218's property-related fee requirements (Article XIII D), but they are fully subject to Proposition 26's broader definition of "tax" under Article XIII C. This creates a regulatory environment in which municipal electric utilities have more rate-setting flexibility than water or sewer utilities in some respects, but face distinct legal risks in others — particularly around general fund transfers.

General Fund Transfers and PILOTs

The most direct Proposition 26 risk for municipal electric utilities arises from the widespread practice of transferring utility revenues to the city's general fund. Approximately 40 California cities operate municipal electric utilities, and many of those cities make annual transfers from the electric utility fund to the general fund. These transfers take various forms — PILOTs calculated as a percentage of fixed assets, percentage-of-revenue formulas, fixed-dollar appropriations, or surplus transfers based on residual balances. The specific structure of the transfer determines its vulnerability to Proposition 26 challenge.

The City of Redding decision established that a PILOT is a cost of the utility, not an exaction on ratepayers, and is therefore not subject to Proposition 26's requirements. However, the Supreme Court's holding was explicitly narrow: because Redding's utility had sufficient non-rate revenue to cover the PILOT, the Court did not need to decide whether the PILOT was a reasonable cost of providing electric service. Municipal utilities that lack substantial non-rate revenue sources face the unresolved question of whether their PILOTs or general fund transfers must meet the "reasonable cost" standard. The Webb and Humphreville decisions provide additional support for the position that interfund transfers are costs rather than exactions, but neither case is from the Supreme Court, and the factual distinctions may limit their applicability.

Rate Design Constraints

Proposition 26's cost-of-service requirement constrains the rate design options available to municipal electric utilities. Under exception §1(e)(2), a charge for a specific government service must not exceed the "reasonable costs to the local government of providing the service." This means that rates must bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the cost of serving the customer class being charged. Rate structures that deviate from cost-of-service principles — such as subsidized lifeline rates funded by other ratepayers, or rates designed to generate surplus revenue for non-utility purposes — are potentially vulnerable to challenge.

The appellate court in the City of Redding litigation offered one notable observation: low-income and senior discounts funded through ratepayer revenue can potentially be justified under Proposition 26 if structured as a reasonable cost of providing service. This position has not been tested at the Supreme Court level, but it provides a potential pathway for socially motivated rate design within the Proposition 26 framework.

Franchise Fees on IOU-Served Customers

Cities that host investor-owned utility (IOU) infrastructure collect franchise fees from the IOU for use of public rights-of-way, which are typically passed through to end-use customers as a surcharge. The Jacks and Zolly decisions have complicated this arrangement by establishing that franchise fees must bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the franchise and that they are "imposed" by local government even when negotiated contractually. Municipal electric utilities that operate alongside IOU service territories — or cities that collect franchise fees from an IOU while also operating a municipal utility — must evaluate whether their franchise fee structures survive scrutiny under the current case law.

Impacts on Community Choice Aggregators

Community Choice Aggregation (CCA) is a relatively recent feature of California's electricity landscape, enabled by Assembly Bill 117 (AB 117) in 2002. As of 2026, 25 operational CCA programs serve more than 15 million customers across 200+ cities and counties in California. CCAs procure electricity on behalf of customers within their jurisdictions, while the incumbent investor-owned utility (IOU) continues to provide transmission, distribution, billing, and metering services. This hybrid structure creates a distinctive Proposition 26 exposure profile that differs from both municipal electric utilities and IOUs.

CCA Rate-Setting Authority and Proposition 26

CCAs set their own generation rates through their governing boards — typically joint powers authorities (JPAs) or city councils — without CPUC approval of those specific rates. This rate-setting authority is a governmental action that could, in theory, be subject to Proposition 26's framework. However, several structural features of the CCA model provide insulation from Proposition 26 challenges. First, CCA participation is voluntary in the sense that customers may opt out and return to IOU service. The availability of this opt-out mechanism weakens the argument that CCA generation charges are "imposed" within Proposition 26's meaning, because customers have a realistic alternative. Second, CCA generation charges are not "property-related fees" subject to Proposition 218, because they are imposed based on electricity consumption, not property ownership. Third, CCA generation rates are straightforwardly covered by exception §1(e)(2) — they are charges for a specific government service (electricity procurement) provided directly to the payor, and they are generally set at or below the cost of providing that service.

The Franchise Fee Exposure

The more significant Proposition 26 risk for CCAs arises indirectly through the franchise fee structure. CCA customers continue to pay IOU delivery charges, which include a Franchise Fee Surcharge (FFS) collected by the IOU on behalf of cities and counties. This surcharge passes franchise fee costs through to all customers — including CCA customers — for the IOU's use of public rights-of-way. The Zolly decision's holding that franchise fees must be justified under Proposition 26's exemptions creates potential exposure for this pass-through structure. If a franchise fee is found to exceed the reasonable value of the franchise, CCA customers would be among those paying the excess — a charge that could be reclassified as a tax requiring voter approval.

Additionally, some CCA-member cities may collect franchise fees from the IOU while also collecting revenue through the CCA program itself. This dual-revenue structure has not been tested under Proposition 26, and it raises questions about whether the combined charges to customers exceed the reasonable costs of the governmental activities being funded.

The Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA)

CCA customers are also charged the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) — a charge set by the CPUC to recover the above-market costs of generation resources that IOUs procured on behalf of customers who have since departed to CCA service. The PCIA is established through CPUC regulatory proceedings, not by local government action, which places it outside the reach of Proposition 26's local government provisions. However, the PCIA is subject to Article XIII A's state-level provisions, which impose a parallel (though not identical) framework. To date, the PCIA has not faced a Proposition 26 challenge, in part because it is structured as a CPUC-authorized charge rather than a locally imposed levy.

Practical Considerations for CCA Governance

CCAs that are organized as joint powers authorities (JPAs) face a nuanced Proposition 26 question regarding their status as "local government" entities. JPAs are creatures of state law and exercise powers delegated by their member jurisdictions. Whether a JPA's charges are "imposed by local government" within the meaning of Proposition 26 is a question that may depend on the specific powers delegated to the JPA and the nature of the charges imposed. CCAs would be well-served by ensuring that their rate-setting processes are transparent, that rates are demonstrably tied to the cost of service, and that reserve policies are defensible as prudent operating requirements rather than surplus revenue generation.

Impacts on Water Utilities

Water and wastewater utilities in California operate under a dual constitutional framework: Proposition 218 governs property-related fees (which includes most retail water and sewer rates), while Proposition 26 provides a parallel and overlapping framework that captures charges falling outside Proposition 218's scope. The interaction between these two constitutional provisions creates a complex compliance environment that is more constrained than what electric or gas utilities face.

Proposition 218: The Primary Constraint on Water Rates

Proposition 218 is the primary constitutional limitation on water and wastewater rates in California. Under Article XIII D, property-related fees — including water and sewer charges — must comply with five substantive requirements: (1) revenues cannot exceed the funds required to provide the service; (2) revenues cannot be used for purposes other than the service; (3) the amount charged to a parcel must not exceed the proportional cost of service attributable to that parcel; (4) charges cannot be imposed for services that are not actually used by or available to the parcel; and (5) the fee must be subject to a majority-protest hearing before adoption. This framework effectively mandates cost-of-service rate design for retail water and wastewater rates.

Unlike electric and gas service, water and sewer service fees are not exempt from Article XIII D. This means water utilities must comply with both Proposition 218's property-related fee requirements and Proposition 26's broader tax definition. In practice, Proposition 218 is the more constraining framework for most retail water rate issues, because its property-related fee requirements are more specific and more restrictive than Proposition 26's general cost-of-service exception.

Where Proposition 26 Adds Constraints for Water Utilities

Proposition 26 extends beyond Proposition 218's reach in several important areas for water utilities. First, Proposition 26 applies to charges that are not "property-related fees" — most notably, wholesale water rates charged by regional suppliers to retail agencies. The PPIC (Public Policy Institute of California) has noted that Proposition 26 may require public wholesale water agencies to justify their rates in a manner similar to Proposition 218's requirements for retail agencies, even though wholesale rates have historically been subject to less rigorous legal constraints.

Second, Proposition 26 may apply to regulatory fees imposed by groundwater management agencies and stormwater management agencies. These agencies often impose fees that address the external costs of their constituents' water and land use activities — fees that, under the Sinclair Paint doctrine, might have been classified as regulatory fees not requiring voter approval. Proposition 26 reclassified many such regulatory fees as taxes, requiring either that the fees fit within one of the seven exceptions or that they be approved by voters.

Stormwater: The Most Constrained Category

Stormwater programs face the most severe funding constraints under the combined Proposition 218/26 framework. Stormwater fees charged to property owners are property-related fees subject to Proposition 218's majority-protest hearing requirement and cost-of-service constraints. Unlike water supply and wastewater service, stormwater management lacks a well-established tradition of user fees, and many agencies have struggled to pass the Proposition 218 process. A 2002 appellate court decision held that a stormwater drainage fee imposed on developed parcels was a property-related fee subject to Article XIII D. The PPIC has identified stormwater as one of California's "fiscal orphans" — essential services that are chronically underfunded because the constitutional framework makes it extraordinarily difficult to raise adequate revenue.

Conservation Rates and Affordability Programs

Proposition 218's cost-of-service requirements create tension with conservation pricing and affordability objectives. Tiered water rates — in which the per-unit price increases with consumption — are a widely used conservation pricing tool. However, under Proposition 218, the higher tiers must be justified by the higher cost of serving high-usage customers, not simply by a desire to discourage consumption. Recent court decisions, including Patz v. City of San Diego and Coziahr v. Otay Water District, have reinforced this cost-of-service constraint. Similarly, lifeline rates or low-income discounts that shift costs from some ratepayers to others may violate Proposition 218's proportionality requirements unless structured carefully. Proposition 26 reinforces these constraints through its parallel cost-of-service exception.

Looking Forward: The Evolving Legal Landscape

The Proposition 26 framework is not static. Several developments signal continuing evolution in the legal constraints facing California utilities.

The Taxpayer Protection Act and Its Aftermath

The Taxpayer Protection and Government Accountability Act (TPA), sponsored by the California Business Roundtable, qualified for the November 2024 ballot with more than one million signatures. The TPA would have significantly expanded the definition of "tax," narrowed the available exceptions, retroactively applied new requirements to charges adopted since 2022, and required voter approval for virtually all new or increased government charges not fitting within tightly defined exceptions. The California Supreme Court removed the TPA from the 2024 ballot in Legislature of the State of California v. Weber (2024), holding that the initiative was a constitutional revision rather than an amendment — and therefore could not be enacted through the initiative process.

Despite the TPA's removal, the political energy behind the initiative has not dissipated. In April 2025, Assemblyman Carl DeMaio introduced ACA 14, a legislative constitutional amendment designed to achieve similar objectives within the amendment framework that the Supreme Court would accept. Similar legislative proposals, including ACA 23, have circulated. The trajectory is clear: advocates for tighter constraints on government-imposed fees will continue to seek expanded voter-approval requirements, and some version of a "Taxpayer Protection Act" may eventually reach the ballot or be adopted through the legislative process.

Pending and Expected Litigation

The Zolly remand will produce additional guidance on franchise fee valuation. As the case proceeds through trial court on remand, the factual record developed will likely provide the first concrete framework for determining whether a franchise fee bears a "reasonable relationship" to the franchise's value. The outcome will directly affect cities statewide that collect franchise fees from IOUs, waste haulers, and telecommunications providers.

Additionally, the City of Gridley v. Superior Court (2024) decision — holding that a general fund transfer from a municipal power utility was not subject to a takings challenge — adds another data point to the municipal electric transfer jurisprudence, though on a different legal theory than Proposition 26.

Implications for Utility Planning

Utility decision-makers should approach Proposition 26 compliance as an ongoing operational requirement, not a one-time legal review. Cost-of-service studies, general fund transfer analyses, and franchise fee valuations should be updated regularly and maintained as contemporaneous records. The burden of proof rests with the local government, and that burden is most effectively met with current, detailed, well-documented financial analysis.

Appendix A: Constitutional Timeline

Appendix B: Court Decision Matrix

References

1. California Legislative Analyst's Office, "Proposition 26: Increases Legislative Vote Requirement to Two-Thirds for State Levies and Charges," November 2010. https://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2010/26_11_2010.aspx
2. League of California Cities, "Proposition 26 Implementation Guide," April 2011.
3. California Special Districts Association, "Proposition 26 Guide for Special Districts," 2011. PDF
4. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 15 Cal. 4th 866 (1997).
5. Schmeer v. County of Los Angeles, 213 Cal.App.4th 1310 (2013).
6. Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding, 6 Cal.5th 1 (2018).
7. Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara, 3 Cal.5th 248 (2017).
8. Webb v. City of Riverside, Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District (2018).
9. Humphreville v. City of Los Angeles, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (2020). FindLaw
10. Zolly v. City of Oakland, S262634, California Supreme Court (August 11, 2022). Justia
11. Hanson Bridgett LLP, "California Supreme Court Allows Challenge to Oakland's Franchise Fee," August 2022. Link
12. Best Best & Krieger LLP, "Transfer of Electric Utility Revenues to City's General Fund is not a Tax Under Proposition 26," August 2018. Link
13. Meyers Nave, "Proposition 26 Update: Court of Appeal Rules that Unsupported Electric Utility Transfers to General Funds Require Voter Approval," 2015. Link
14. Cal Cities, "California Supreme Court ruling in franchise fee case offers more questions than answers," August 2022. Link
15. California Budget & Policy Center, "Proposition 26: Should the State and Local Governments Be Required to Meet Higher Voting Thresholds to Raise Revenues?", September 2010. PDF
16. UC Berkeley School of Law, "Proposition 26: California's Stealth Initiative," 2010. Link
17. PPIC Water Policy Center, "Paying for Water in California: Technical Appendices." PDF
18. PPIC, "Prop 218's Ongoing Impacts on California Water," August 2025. Link
19. California Public Utilities Commission, "Community Choice Aggregation — Consumer Information." Link
20. California Community Choice Association (CalCCA), 2026. https://cal-cca.org/
21. Legislature of the State of California v. Weber, 16 Cal.5th 237 (2024).
22. Ballotpedia, "California Two-Thirds Legislative Vote and Voter Approval for New or Increased Taxes Initiative (2024)." Link
23. Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, PC, "Public Revenues & Rate-Making" practice overview. Link
24. Somach Simmons & Dunn, "California Court of Appeal Holds that a Water District's Surcharge Violates Proposition 218," February 2025. Link

NewGen Strategies & Solutions is a utility regulatory and financial consulting firm serving electric, water, wastewater, and solid waste utilities nationwide. This report is provided for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Utility decision-makers should consult qualified legal counsel regarding the application of Propositions 26 and 218 to their specific circumstances.

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